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LABOR LAW-EVIDENCE-PRODUCTION OF PRE-TRIAL STATEMENTS FOR PUR-
POSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN NLRB PROCEEDINGS-Respondent was ac-
cused of unfair labor practices. At the hearing before the trial examiner, re-
spondent requested pre-trial statements of the general counsel's witnesses 
who testified, for the purpose of impeaching their credibility on cross-exam-
ination. The trial examiner's refusal was upheld by the NLRB.1 Upon 
motion to reopen the record, held, the record is reopened and further 
proceedings are to be held before the trial examiner. The holding of 
Jencks v. United States2 applies to NLRB proceedings; hence respondent 
has the right for cross-examination purposes to production of pre-trial 
statements made by the general counsel's witnesses which directly relate 
1 Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. No. '73, 42 L.R1R.M. 1001 (1958). 
2 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
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to their testimony. Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 42 L.R.R.M. 
1403 (1958). 
In the Jencks case, which was a criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court 
held that the accused had the right to inspect pre-trial statements made 
by the government's witnesses which touched upon the subject matter of 
their testimony. While the government had the right to elect not to 
produce such statements, if it so elected, the case was to be dismissed. 
Thereafter, the NLRB held in a series of cases3 that this rule was restricted 
to criminal cases and did not apply to board proceedings governed by 
the Administrative Procedure Act.4 A recent decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit,5 however, prompted the Board to change 
its position. This extension of the Jencks rule to an NLRB proceeding seems 
logical, for although such proceeding is not a punitive action in the 
criminal sense, it is a public prosecution by the general counsel charging 
violations of the Labor-Management Relations Act.6 Thus it is necessary 
to balance the individual's right fully to protect himsel£7 against the 
government agency's right to keep its records confidential.8 Undoubtedly 
s Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 118 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 40 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1957); 
Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 119 N.L.R.B. No. 227, 41 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1958); Operat-
ing Engineers Union, 120 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 42 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1958); Baltimore Steam 
Packet Co., 120 N.L.R.B. No. 193, 42 L.R.R.M. 1215 (1958); E. V. Prentice Machine Works, 
Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. No. 210, 42 L.R.R.M. 1246 (1958). 
4 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001 et seq. But see Communist Party of the 
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 254 F. (2d) 314, 
holding the Jencks rule applicable to the Subversive Activities Control Board which is 
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 
5 NLRB v. Adhesive Products Corp., (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 403, denying enforce-
ment 117 N.L.R.B. 265 (1957). 
6 " ••• [I]t Uencks rule] should apply to any case where the government prosecutes 
a violation of law ••.. It cannot be contended that an unfair labor practice proceeding 
is 'purely civil' in nature. It is not litigation of the rights of private parties but it is a 
prosecution initiated by the General Counsel of the Board wherein he charges that a 
Respondent has violated certain provisions of the Act and accordingly seeks certain 
remedies. Though the Act is neither punitive nor compensatory but preventative and 
remedial in its nature, it establishes a public procedure looking only to public ends •••• " 
Member Jenkins dissenting in part, Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., note 3 supra, at 
1340. See also Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board, note 4 supra; NLRB v. Adhesive Products Corp., note 5 supra. 
7 It is a generally accepted rule of evidence that a witness may be required to produce 
for inspection any statements or notes which he uses to refresh his memory while testify-
ing. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §763 (1940). This principle was extended to include 
statements used prior to trial to refresh the witness's memory. Goldman v. United States, 
316 U.S. 129 (1942), held that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in not 
ordering the production of such a statement, thus implying that such statements may 
be required to be produced. In Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953), the Court 
held that pre-trial statements should be ordered to be produced upon the laying of a 
preliminary foundation of inconsistency between them and the actual testimony. The 
final extension came in the Jencks case. 
s Pursuant to congressional authority the NLRB has promulgated rules which prevent 
the public disclosure of its records except by the permission of designated officials. 
N.L.R.B. Rules and Regulations 102.87, Series 6, 16 FED. ,REG, 1934, 1947, 1948, as amended 
at 17 FED. REG. 4983. 
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the result in the principal case will better enable a respondent to defend 
himself in that he will have a greater opportunity to impeach the credi-
bility of the general counsel's witnesses. It may be feared that investi-
gation of violations will be impeded if assurance cannot be given that 
statements will be kept confidential. But this objection should not be 
too serious since normally only those persons willing to testify will be 
likely to have their pre-trial statements made public.9 It remains to be 
seen whether the Board will apply the Jencks rule to its full extent. Al-
though no modifications were indicated by the decision in the principal case, 
Congress has restricted application of this rule in criminal proceedings 
in two important respects.1° First, if the government elects not to produce 
the requested statements, either the testimony will be stricken or a 
mistrial will be declared, but no dismissal will result.11 Although the 
question whether the proceeding must be dismissed did not arise in the 
instant case, a mere striking of the testimony would seem sufficient sanction 
in NLRB proceedings since the danger of prejudicially impressing a 
jury does not exist. It would appear that under either form of the rule 
the effect will be approximately the same. If the modified rule were applied 
the testimony will be stricken if the general counsel elects not to produce 
the requested· statements, but there will be no dismissal. If the rule is 
applied in unmodified form, the general counsel can avoid dismissal by 
determining prior to the hearing which statements he is willing to_ make 
public and allow only those witnesses to testify. The second restriction 
now in .force in criminal cases provides that where the government claims 
that pre-trial statements contain matter not directly relating to the testi-
mony, the statements are delivered first to the trial judge who extracts 
the immaterial portions before turning the statements over to the accused.12 
This modification would give more security to the NLRB records yet 
still allow respondent the right to secure pre-trial statements directly relating 
to the testimony of the witness. It would seem desirable for the Board to 
modify application of the Jencks rule to some extent, for otherwise the 
respondent in an NLRB proceeding would be given greater protection than 
the accused in a criminal proceeding.13 
Bruce L. Bower 
9 Under the Jencks rule, only those statements made by the witness which touch 
upon the subject matter of his testimony must be produced. Hence only a person who 
testifies risks the possibility of the public disclosure of his pre-trial statements, and then 
only to the extent to which he testifies. 
10 18 u.s.c. (Supp. V, 1958) §3500. See notes, 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 314 (1957); 67 YALE 
L. J. 674 (1958). ' 
11Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 On the other hand it could be argued that such a situation is quite consistent on 
the ground that the need for protection of NLRB records is not as great as that needed 
by criminal enforcement agencies. 
